On Liberty and its Superficiality

The Primacy of Liberty

The primary reason why liberty (and with all its consequences), as Mill suggested in his essay (On Liberty), should be the primary guiding principle for any society which expects progress is the empirical fact that “all are liable to err.” It has proven useful to society to leave one, excepting minors and individuals practically thought of as incapable of independence, on his own; and that society should not coerce its received notions (e.g., any group in society, either in the majority or in the minority) of proper and decent modes of living, though it may give advise, warning, or even persuade the individual. Such received notions and modes (or moods) of thinking, as seen in custom and social norms, however fierce and authoritative their sources, are not without the qualities of being fallible or being rendered obsolete
through time, as Mill suggested, and that society is better off to admit a variety in styles of living; for such varieties give men choices – what lifestyles to emulate and avoid, and thus would, hopefully, bring everyone, to improved conditions. Here, the primacy of liberty is not grounded to some a priori principles but simply in its utility to achieve whatever a man feels it needs to achieve, “[his] good, in [his] own way.”

The Primacy of Liberty

The primary reason why liberty (and with all its consequences), as Mill suggested in his essay (On Liberty), should be the primary guiding principle for any society which expects progress is the empirical fact that “all are liable to err.” It has proven useful to society to leave one, excepting minors and individuals practically thought of as incapable of independence, on his own; and that society should not coerce its received notions (e.g., any group in society, either in the majority or in the minority) of proper and decent modes of living, though it may give advise, warning, or even persuade the individual. Such received notions and modes (or moods) of thinking, as seen in custom and social norms, however fierce and authoritative their sources, are not without the qualities of being fallible or being rendered obsolete through time, as Mill suggested, and that society is better off to admit a variety in styles of living; for such varieties give men choices – what lifestyles to emulate and avoid, and thus would, hopefully, bring everyone, to improved conditions. Here, the primacy of liberty is not grounded to some a priori principles but simply in its utility to achieve whatever a man feels it needs to achieve, “[his] good, in [his] own way.”

Rather than centering the liberty of man on its utility and indispensability to achieve improved conditions, Kantian thought suggests that man is inviolable owing to his capacity to rational choice; such rational choice as only possible when he is given liberty. This capacity is best seen, or is only possible, when society recognizes his individual liberty – a society that does otherwise, violates his humanity and is therefore inhuman, and unjust. Any form of violation, such as having some sort of human “sacrifices” for the benefit of the rest, however useful and beneficial would be the desired effect, will be rendered unjust.

A strict Kantian view, as Nozick noted, is not always possible, especially now in modern and capitalistic societies. But since, as he himself would assume, an individual’s liberty is primary, the dilemma is solved by the (minimal) state. The primary purpose of the state, he argues, is to provide codes (our Labor Code, for instance) that permit the use of the individual; such codes will, however, see to it that the individual is used “only in certain ways” which does not, in any way, totally violate his liberty.

Whatever revision the recognition of an individual’s liberty undergoes, it is still taken as primary and inalienable (especially in a democratic society). There are, however, (pre)conditions with which the recognition and recognition of liberty is gravely affected. This is best seen in the economic. For how could one will something, if one has an empty stomach? What would be the kind of decisions of an unfed and malnourished agent? The existing defense and arguments for an individual’s liberty seemed to take the economic as something unproblematic and given. It is, however, otherwise. And such fact makes things interesting if we are to take the same position. The proposed views that will follow would try to mitigate this dilemma; such that the economic is solved, and no real violation of an individual’s rights has taken place. But it is more fitting to discuss first the nature of such primary social (economic) goods.

Primary Social Goods

Though a man, since his liberty to decide and act is observed by society, is able to design his rational plans in life, such plans are always influenced by the kind of goods he has at present. Further, whatever his rational plan in life will be, he will still be in need of some basic, and this are the most important ones, primary goods without which the achievement and enactment of his rational plans are impossible. Such goods, moreover, are either natural or social. By social, we mean goods that are circulated in society, which an individual has some, more or less, control e.g. the quality of diet, types of clothing, shelter, medication, etc.; but by natural we mean goods that are naturally given to an individual, and most often manifested in the physical, e.g. the ability to see, hear, walk, etc., the alteration or improvement of which would most probably require social goods.

Far from regarding the individual as completely subservient to these facts and basic needs, one might entertain the idea that the individual has the ability, owing to his humanity and unpredictability, to alter and adjust his condition. But the very notion of adjustments and decisions, if such are to be rational, implies that some considerations were taken. It is not a problem if the considerations taken were solely due to the consequences of an individual’s decision. But removing the complete accountability of the individual, as in the cases of externalities (e.g. a factory emitting filth causing the river to be poisoned affecting the livelihood of fishermen, and the drinking water of nearby settlers, which will later affect their general health); and by natural circumstance, a man born blind situated in a society ignorant of the Braille – how are we to account for these, then? These are obvious situations which clearly affects his liberty, present and future circumstances, and that a state which promotes such a right but remains blind to such stressing realities (as the preconditions of what is being promoted) is insubstantial and superficial. It might be more acceptable if such a society never confessed such a view; but then again, the concept of liberty is very consoling, that one needs to find some ways to face these very issues.

John Rawls suggested that the admission of an individual’s liberty as something superior to the economic is due to the feeling that the former is possible and that the latter as finally surmounted. Had we remained in the kind of life and society some thousand years ago, we are not to think this way. We think that social goods are abundant; or that natural circumstances which are discomforting to the individual are easily, by today’s standards, acted upon and improved by society: that mankind had discovered another more pressing need calling satisfaction, other than such an ignoble need. This type of thinking would naturally prefer liberty as something primary. But in societies where this is not the case, it is not uncommon to see an exchange of one’s liberty for the sake of some social goods (vote buying, for instance). One is to feel restrained, if criticized of such an action; either that such man feels that his basic physical needs are more primary than the liberty recognized by his society; or he feels that it is completely his right (or as a last resort?) to acquire a social good at the expense of his (by today’s prevailing sentiments) basic liberties.

Realizing the superficiality of an individual’s liberty in the larger scheme of things (i.e. social, economic, and natural contingencies), the tendency is to attempt to mitigate this superficiality, such that the original purpose (the individual’s liberty), through such attempt, is not defeated. One method is to assume a (social) structure. Like any other structure, theorizing is possible as to guide the applications of any desired changes and control on such a structure and system; the applications being the attempt to mitigate, or reconcile, the influence of society on an individual’s liberty, so that all can have the basic rights, thus equality; and that since, all were given, no one was violated (of his rights). Such a social structure determines “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.” There has to be some methods and principles, however, by which such an influential structure is to be subjected, then evaluated, and insured, of its justice. continue reading -->